When simple voting doesn't work Multicameral systems for the representation and aggregation of interests in international organizations

Erscheinungsform:	Aufsatz
Autor/Urheber:	Bräuninger, Thomas
Identifikatoren/Sonstige Nummern:	1642542571 [PPN]
In:	Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1971 33(2003), 4, Seite 681-703 volume:33 year:2003 number:4 pages:681-703
Inhalt:	This article analyses the origins and consequences of multicameral representation and voting in international organizations. It is argued that the existence of visible and durable conflicts in an issue area can make standard procedures such as unicameral majority voting ineffective with respect to the functioning of the regime. Applying spatial models of strategic decision making, it is asserted that multicameralism is more likely to be effective than unicameralism if chambers consist of key groups with distinct interests. Empirical evidence is provided by studying the multicameral voting rule in the Council of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). I compare likely decision-making outcomes under unicameral and multicameral voting rules from 1996 to 2002 and find that multicameral outcomes are more likely to be stable and supported by those actors critical for the effective functioning of the regime. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
Schlagwörter:	Internationale Organisation, Entscheidungsverfahren, Abstimmung, Wahl, Mehrheitsprinzip, Repräsentativität, Entscheidungsprozess
Weiter im Partnersystem:	https://swb.bsz-bw.de/DB=2.1/PPNSET?PPN=1642542571

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